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A FRACKING FRAGILE ISSUE: COURTS CONTINUE TO
TIPTOE AROUND SUBSURFACE TRESPASS CLAIMS
DANIELLE QUINN†
I. INTRODUCTION
Hydraulic fracturing, also known as hydrofracking or fracking,
is a stimulation process used to extract natural gas and oil from the
earth by fracturing rock trapped deep underground.1  Human-in-
duced non-hydraulic fracking began in the mid-1860s when people
began drilling wells to extract minerals, such as gas and oil, from
the ground.2  To extract these minerals, operators lowered explo-
sives into the wells in order to blast fractures into the oil bearing
sand.3  By the 1930s, drillers began “using acid rather than nitro-
glycerin as a non-explosive substitute” because “[t]he fractures
caused by acid etching were more resistant to re-closing, thereby
enhancing productivity.”4  Drillers then began using hydraulic frac-
turing in the 1940s, but it was not until 2003 that its use became
widespread by energy companies searching for natural gas.5  Addi-
† J.D., 2015, Villanova University School of Law; B.S., 2012, High Point
University.
1. Shooters – A “Fracking” History, AM. OIL & GAS HISTORICAL SOC’Y, http://
aoghs.org/technology/hydraulic-fracturing/ (last visited Dec. 22, 2014) (explain-
ing fracking process).
2. Id. (providing short history of fracking technology). “Today’s hydraulic
fracturing technologies can trace their roots to April 25, 1865, when Civil War
veteran Col. Edward A. L. Roberts received the first of his many patents for an
‘exploding torpedo.’” Id.
3. Id. (detailing early drilling methods).
4. A Look At What Hydraulic Fracking Is and Its History, STI GROUP, http://setx
ind.com/upstream/what-hydraulic-fracking-is-and-its-history/ (last visited Dec. 22,
2014) (describing benefits of acid etching).
5. A Brief History of Hydraulic Fracturing, EEC ENVTL., http://www.eecworld.
com/services/258-a-brief-history-of-hydraulic-fracturing (last visited Dec. 22, 2014)
(dating modern hydraulic fracturing practices).  Texas, Pennsylvania, West Vir-
ginia, Wyoming, Utah and Maryland were among the first states to engage in wide-
spread use of hydraulic fracturing in their shale formations. Id.  In the 1940s,
(1)
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tionally, horizontal drilling began in the 1990s “when George P.
Mitchell, considered by many to be the ‘father of modern fracking’
pioneered the technique . . . combined it with hydraulic fracking in
the Barnett Shale of Texas.”6
Today, fracking typically occurs in three stages: primary recov-
ery, secondary recovery, and enhanced recovery.7  During primary
recovery, which occurs after the well is drilled, the contents of the
well naturally rise to the surface due to gravity and the pressure
inside the reservoir.8  This process continues until the pressure in-
side the reservoir is equalized and the well no longer produces oil.9
The secondary recovery process begins when a mixture of water
and chemicals are pumped into the ground through a high pres-
sure vertical well, which causes the rock to fracture.10  As the sub-
surface rock fractures, gas and oil flow from high-pressure areas to
newly formed low-pressure areas.11  After the fractures are created,
the fracking fluid flows back into the well and up to the surface with
the gas.12  The primary drawback with this practice, however, is that
only twenty to forty percent of the fluid returns to the surface, with
“Floyd Farris of Stanolind Oil and Gas Corporation began studying the relation-
ship between a well’s performance and the treatment pressures on it.” See A Look
At What Hydraulic Fracking Is and Its History, supra note 4.  Farris’ “research led to
the first experimental hydraulic fracturing which occurred in 1947 at the Hugoton
gas field, located in Grant County, Kansas.” Id.  Although his experiment was fairly
unsuccessful, “[r]esearch continued and on March 17, 1949 the Halliburton Oil
Well Cementing Company conducted two commercial hydraulic fracking treat-
ments.  One was performed in Stephens County, Oklahoma, and the other was
performed in Archer County, Texas.  These applications were much more success-
ful and from there the technique took off.” Id.
6. See A Look At What Hydraulic Fracking Is and Its History, supra note 4 (noting
emergence of horizontal drilling).
7. For further discussion of the recovery processes, see infra notes 8-17.
8. Lance Looper, What is Primary Oil Recovery?, HOW STUFF WORKS, http://
science.howstuffworks.com/environmental/energy/primary-oil-recovery.htm (last
visited Feb. 1, 2015) (explaining primary recovery process).  “Primary recovery is
an important step in the process because the natural pressure inside the under-
ground reservoir must be equalized before any equipment can be installed.” Id.
9. Id. (noting duration of primary recovery and its importance).  Only about
ten percent of the reserve’s supply is captured through this method. Id.
10. A Brief History of Hydraulic Fracturing, supra note 5 (explaining secondary
recovery process).  “The chemicals used in this process include but are not limited
to: benzene, gelling agents, crosslinkers, friction reducers, corrosion inhibitors,
scale inhibitors, biocides and, in some cases, diesel fuel.” Id.  Despite the fact that
the fractures are “typically less than 1mm [wide, they] greatly increase the permea-
bility of underground rock and allow larger volumes of oil or gas to be recovered.”
Id.
11. Id. (explaining effect of pressure on gas and oil flow).
12. Id. (describing how fracture lines work to produce oil).
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the rest remaining underground.13  This results in millions of gal-
lons of water, as well as tens or hundreds of thousands of pounds of
sand, remaining in the ground per well.14  After the primary and
secondary recovery processes have been completed, many well op-
erators will conduct an enhanced oil recovery.15  This is accom-
plished through thermal recovery, gas injection, or chemical
injection.16  The enhanced recovery process has the potential to
produce up to twice as much oil as the primary or secondary recov-
ery processes.17
By 2010, “around sixty percent of all new crude oil and natural
gas wells worldwide were using the process of hydraulic fracturing
to increase production and efficiency.”18  Indeed, “[s]ince 2000,
649 wells have been drilled in Susquehanna County, Pennsylvania
alone, 99.5% of which have been hydraulically fractured since
2009.”19  Not only has hydraulic fracturing played a vital role in in-
creasing gas and oil production, it has also created approximately
two and a half million jobs, over one million of which are in the
United States.20  The Marcellus Shale Education and Training
Center report on drilling “found that each new well drilled in the
13. Enhanced Oil Recovery, DEPT. OF ENERGY, http://energy.gov/fe/science-in
novation/oil-gas-research/enhanced-oil-recovery (last visited Jan. 31, 2015) (ex-
plaining drawbacks of secondary recovery process).
14. Id. (providing statistics regarding amount of water and sand injected per
well and amount remaining below ground).  “Initially, the technology used 20,000
to 80,000 gallons of water per well, but todays advanced fracturing techniques can
use up to 8 million gallons of water and 75,000 to 320,000 pounds of sand (prop-
pant) per well.” Id.
15. Id. (explaining enhanced recovery process).
16. Id. (noting types of enhanced recovery).
17. Id. (describing increase in oil recovery during enhanced recovery
process).
18. A Look At What Hydraulic Fracking Is and Its History, supra note 4 (noting
amount of crude oil produced internationally using hydraulic fracturing).  In the
United States, approximately thirty percent of recoverable oil and natural gas
reserves are accessible through the hydraulic fracturing process. See Shooters – A
“Fracking” History, supra note 1 (providing statics about gas and oil capture in
United States).  Thirty percent of recoverable oil and natural gas equates to “about
seven billion barrels of oil and six hundred trillion cubic feet of natural gas.” Id.
19. Ely v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., No. 3:09-cv-2284, 2014 WL 4071640, at *5
(M.D. Pa. 2014) (providing statistics concerning fracking in Susquehanna County,
Pennsylvania).  The Marcellus Shale in Pennsylvania could potentially contain
enough gas to power all American homes for nearly 50 years at current residential
use rates. Id.
20. A Look At What Hydraulic Fracking Is and Its History, supra note 4 (recogniz-
ing increase in job creation related to fracking).  In addition to creating millions
of jobs, hydraulic fracturing has greatly increased revenue in remote rural areas.
Id.
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Marcellus Shale [in Pennsylvania] generated 30 jobs and $4 million
in total output within Pennsylvania’s economy.”21
Despite its positive impact on gas and oil production and job
creation, however, many oppose hydraulic fracturing citing its nega-
tive effects.22  Hydraulic fracturing can have a substantial negative
impact on local, national, and global levels.23  For example, meth-
ane gas has the potential to escape from the well and cause explo-
sions such as the 2014 Chevron well explosion in Pennsylvania.24
Further, when the injected water returns to the surface, it typically
contains a high concentration of salt, along with a low, but
measureable, concentration of radioactive elements.25  If this water
is not disposed of properly, it can have detrimental effects on the
environment, and therefore, it is usually injected into deep disposal
wells thousands of feet below the surface, which, in some instances,
has triggered small earthquakes.26  Moreover, when the fluids are
injected into the ground, whether through the recovery or disposal
process, fracture lines or waste plumes can travel hundreds of feet,
potentially crossing over onto someone else’s property.27
This article discusses whether subsurface fracture lines, as well
as fracking fluids seeping through the ground onto other proper-
ties, constitute trespass.  Part II of this article provides the history of
21. Ely, 2014 WL 4071640, at *6 (providing statistics on financial impact of
drilling in Pennsylvania).
22. Nick Cunningham, As Fracking Expands, So Does Opposition – Even in Texas,
OIL PRICE (July 16, 2014) http://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/As-Frack
ing-Expands-So-Does-Opposition-Even-In-Texas.html (discussing fracking opposi-
tion movement).
23. For further discussion of the negative impact of fracking, see infra notes
24-27 and accompanying text.
24. Molly Born & Sean Hamill, Greene County Shale Well Continues Burning,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Feb. 12, 2014), http://www.post-gazette.com/local/
south/2014/02/11/Gas-well-explodes-in-southeastern-Greene-County/stories/201
402110126 (discussing Chevron well blow out that burned for days).  “The heat
from the blaze—which caused a tanker truck on site that was full of propane gas to
explode—was so intense that first responders from local fire departments had to
pull back rather than risk injury.” Id.  The explosion was so bad that a team of well
fire experts had to be flown in from Texas to control the blaze. Id.
25. Susan Brantley & Anna Meyendorff, The Facts on Fracking, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
13, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/14/opinion/global/the-facts-on-
fracking.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (explaining opposition to fracking).
26. Id. (detailing water condition when it emerges from fracking wells).
“Only about eight locations have experienced injection-induced earthquakes.” Id.
27. See Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 7 (Tx. 2008)
(noting how far fractures will travel depends on well design).  “Engineers design a
fracing operation for a particular well, selecting the injection pressure, volumes of
material injected, and the type of proppant to achieve a desired result based on
data regarding the porosity, permeability, and modulus of the rick, and the pres-
sure and other aspects of the reservoir.” Id.
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subsurface rights and the cases leading up to the conflicting deci-
sions in Coastal Oil and Stone.  Part III examines the three most re-
cent cases involving subsurface trespass and the confusion that has
resulted from their conflicting holdings.  Part IV analyzes the
courts’ rationales behind the holdings in Coastal Oil, Stone, and FPL.
Finally, Part V assesses the impact Coastal Oil, Stone, and FPL will
have on the future of subsurface trespass law.
II. BACKGROUND
Due to rapid technological advances, courts, along with state
and federal legislatures, have not been able to keep up with the oil
and gas industry.28  This has led to substantial environmental and
property rights concerns and courts continue to struggle with what
ownership theory should be applied to subsurface minerals and
how to determine whether an actionable trespass has occurred.
A. Fracking Ahead of the Law
As a result of an Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
study, which found that fracking posed no threat to underground
drinking water, the Bush Administration exempted hydraulic frac-
turing from the Safe Drinking Water Act in 2005.29  The EPA study,
however, “focused solely on the effect hydraulic fracturing has on
drinking water in coal bed methane deposits, typically shallow for-
mations where gas is embedded in coal,” and failed to “consider the
impact of above-ground drilling or of drilling in geologic forma-
tions deep underground, where many of the large new gas reserves
are being developed.”30  As a result of continued concern, the EPA
continues to research the relationship between hydraulic fracturing
and ground water used for drinking, but as of 2012, the fracking
process is still exempt from several major federal regulations, most
notably, the Clean Water Act and Superfund.31
28. For further discussion of how fracking technology has outpaced laws and
regulations, see infra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
29. See Coastal Oil, 268 S.W.3d at 1 (discussing impact of EPA ground water
study).  Despite the study, however, controversy still surrounds the practice of
fracking. Id.  “Chief concerns include the high consumption of water resources,
the generation of large volumes of wastewater, the irreversible injection of chemi-
cals deep underground and their potential impact on drinking water and surface
water resources.” Id.
30. Abraham Lustgarten, Buried Secrets: Is Natural Gas Drilling Endangering U.S.
Water Supplies?, PROPUBLICA (Nov. 13, 2008), http://www.propublica.org/article/
buried-secrets-is-natural-gas-drilling-endangering-us-water-supplies-1113 (detailing
flaws in EPA study).
31. A Brief History of Hydraulic Fracturing, supra note 5 (stating growing con-
cerns caused EPA to continue studying impact of fracking on drinking water).
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In addition to the lack of environmental regulations, subsur-
face property rights concerning hydraulic fracturing are also very
blurred.  The primary issue courts face is determining which owner-
ship theory applies to oil, gas, and subsurface space located
thousands of feet below the surface.32  Once the ownership theory
is determined, courts can then address the issue of trespass and
what, if any, rights the harmed landowner has.33
Due to major scientific and technological advances, classic the-
ories of property ownership have changed drastically over the
years.34  The ad coelum doctrine, one of the oldest property owner-
ship theories, is now rarely used.35  The courts have created new
theories in an attempt to keep up with these ever-changing ad-
vances.36  Such theories include the rule of capture and the correla-
tive rights doctrine.37  Changes in ownership theory did not end
there, however, as these theories eventually gave way to ownership-
in-place and non-ownership theories.38
B. Ad Coelum Doctrine
The ad coelum doctrine provides that the owner of land owns
not just the surface, but also the entire airspace above it and the
entire subsurface below it, down to the earth’s core.39  The doc-
trine’s name comes from the Latin phrase “cujus est solum ejus est
usque ad coelom et ad inferos,” which translates to “for whoever
owns the soil, it is theirs up to Heaven and down to Hell.”40  This
legal maxim ironically made its debut in English common law in
1587; today, however, the United Kingdom is in the process of pass-
ing a law that allows fracking companies to drill under people’s
32. For further discussion of what ownership theory should be applied to sub-
surface property rights, see infra notes 36-95 and accompanying text.
33. For further discussion of property owners’ subsurface rights see infra
notes 96-133.
34. For further discussion of technological advances in fracking, see supra
notes 4-12 and accompanying text.
35. For further discussion of the ad coelum doctrine, see infra notes 39-47
and accompanying text.
36. For further discussion of the various subsurface property rights theories,
see infra notes 38-95 and accompanying text.
37. For further discussion of the rule of capture and correlative rights doc-
trine, see infra notes 48-92 and accompanying text.
38. For further discussion of ownership-in-place and non-ownership theories,
see infra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
39. Keith Hall, Hydraulic Fracturing: If Fractures Cross Property Line, Is There An
Actionable Subsurface Trespass?, 54 NAT. RES. J. 361, 375 (Fall 2014) (providing his-
tory of ad coelum doctrine).
40. Id. (giving Latin translation).
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land without first obtaining consent.41  Under the Petroleum (Pro-
duction) Act of 1934, “ownership of all petrol and natural gas lying
anywhere underground in the UK was ‘vested in His Majesty,’”
which allowed the government to “grant licenses on the Crown’s
behalf to companies wishing to exploit the resources on a case-by-
case basis, with license-holders entitled to compulsory access powers
if they cannot negotiate with the owners of land they needed to use
to get at the petroleum.”42
On numerous occasions in the United States, courts have held
that airspace intrusions can constitute a trespass, such as when a
roof hangs over a property line, but these trespass cases have all
dealt with intrusions close to the surface.43  In 1934, the Georgia
Supreme Court in Thrasher v. City of Atlanta held that “[p]ossession
is the basis of all ownership” and therefore title to land “can hardly
extend above an altitude representing the reasonable possibility of
man’s occupation and domain.”44  The United States Supreme
Court solidified this theory in U.S. v. Causby when it held that the
“doctrine has no place in the modern world [because] [t]he air is a
public highway.”45  Sixty-two years later, the Texas Supreme Court
applied the holding in Causby to Coastal Oil, a case dealing with sub-
surface trespass, concluding that not only does the ad coelum doc-
trine have no place in the modern world, but the rule of capture
bars any trespass claim in oil and gas cases.46  Conversely, despite
being considered an archaic application of the law, the Third Cir-
cuit in Stone applied Causby to reach a vastly different conclusion
than the Coastal court.47
C. The Rule of Capture
The rule of capture “encourage[s] the development and ex-
ploitation of natural resources in the U.S. by modifying the poten-
tial obstacles of the ad coelum doctrine and traditional trespass
41. Ed Lowther, Location, Salvation, Damnation, BBC NEWS (Jan. 29, 2014),
http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-25742871 (discussing UK’s proposed law to
allow drilling under anyone’s private property).
42. Id. (providing history of UK’s drilling laws).
43. For further discussion of cases discussing airspace rights, see infra notes
44-47 and accompanying text.
44. Thrasher v. City of Atlanta, 173 S.E. 817, 825 (Ga. 1934) (explaining limita-
tion on ad coelum doctrine).
45. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 260 (1946) (holding ad coelum doc-
trine does not apply to airspace used by airplanes).
46. Coastal Oil, 268 S.W.3d at 12 (holding rule of capture bars trespass claim
and ad coelum doctrine does not apply).
47. For further discussion of Stone, see infra notes 147-151 and accompanying
text.
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liability.”48  The United States Supreme Court first recognized the
rule of capture in 1895 when it held:
[Petroleum oil and gas] belong to the owner of the land,
and are part of it, so long as they are on it or in it subject
to his control; but when they escape and go into other
land, or come under another’s control, the title of the for-
mer owner is gone.  If an adjoining owner drills his own
land, and taps a deposit of oil or gas, extending under his
neighbor’s field, so that it comes into his well, it becomes
his property.49
Before the discovery of hydraulic fracturing, this rule was ap-
plied to standard wells.50  This meant that the oil, gas, or water
flowed naturally into the well without artificial manipulation.
Breakthroughs in science and technology, however, revealed that
these substances are not migratory, but rather, they are “commonly
found in underground reservoirs, [that] are securely entrapped in
a static condition in the original pool, and, ordinarily, so remain
until disturbed by penetrations from the surface.”51
1. Case Law
Two years after the Supreme Court established the rule of cap-
ture, the Ohio Supreme Court in Kelly v. Ohio Oil held “[w]hatever
gets into the well belongs to the owner of the well, no matter where
it came from.”52  In Kelly, the defendant drilled his wells within two
hundred feet of the plaintiff’s property line.53  The plaintiff sued
for damages claiming that the defendant was taking his minerals via
the wells.54  In reaching its holding, the Ohio Supreme Court rec-
48. Aaron Stemplewicz, The Known “Unknowns” of Hydraulic Fracturing: A Case
for a Traditional Subsurface Trespass Regime in Pennsylvania, 13 BUQ. BUS. L.J. 219, 226
(2011) (explaining effect of rule of capture on ad coelum doctrine).
49. Brown v. Spilman, 155 U.S. 670, 670 (1895) (applying rule of capture to oil
and gas).  The case dealt with an oil and gas lease that only covered a portion of
the property and addressed whether the lessee was entitled to all the oil and gas
under the property or just the specific area that was leased. Id.
50. Id. (applying rule of capture to standard well); see also supra note 46 an
accompanying text (noting application of rule of capture before rise of hydraulic
fracturing).
51. Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 210 S.W.2d 558, 561 (Tex. 1948) (explaining
how oil and gas are stored below surface).
52. Kelly v. Ohio Oil Co., 57 Ohio St. 317, 327-28 (Ohio 1897) (holding well
contents are property of well owner).
53. Id. at 329 (noting location of defendant’s wells).
54. Id. (stating facts of case).  It was estimated that the oil drained from the
wells would be drawn from a two hundred to two hundred and fifty foot radius. Id.
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ognized it is impossible to tell where exactly the well contents came
from.55  The court explained that while petroleum is in the earth, it
can move from place to place, and wherever it presently lies, it is
part of that tract of land “until it reaches a well, and is raised to the
surface, and then for the first time it becomes the subject of distinct
ownership, separate from the realty, and becomes personal prop-
erty, the property of the person in whose well it came.”56
A decade later, in a factually similar case, the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court held that the defendant could crowd the adjoining
property with wells and the neighbor could do nothing but “go and
do likewise.”57  In other words, “[h]e must protect his own oil and
gas [because] [h]e knows it is wild and will run away if it finds an
opening and it is his business to keep it at home.”58
As demonstrated by the cases above, the rule of capture limits
the liability of landowners who drain oil and gas reservoirs below
their property, and potentially below their neighbor’s property.59
Additionally, it encourages excessive drilling by landowners in or-
der to be the first to capture, and thus profit from the oil and gas
located below their properties.60  Excessive drilling, however, typi-
cally leads to waste because the fractures decrease the overall pres-
sure which causes the gas to flow into the wells.61  In response to
these concerns, courts developed the correlative rights doctrine.62
2. Correlative Rights Doctrine
The correlative rights doctrine gives landowners sharing a
common reservoir a fair chance to drill and produce oil.63  In Young
v. Ethyl Corp., the Eighth Circuit asserted “[t]his doctrine allows
owners of land to extract oil or gas from a common pool, but posits
two duties which limit the right of a landowner to drain oil and gas
55. Id. (noting it is impossible to pinpoint where well contents came from).
56. Id. at 328 (explaining how petroleum moves from place to place and
when it becomes someone’s personal property).
57. Barnard v. Monongahela Natural Gas Co., 65 A. 801, 801 (Pa. 1907) (holding
neighbor had no remedy against driller but to also drill wells to capture oil).
58. Id.
59. For further discussion of the liability limitations created by the rule of
capture, see supra notes 52-58 and accompanying text.
60. For further discussion of the consequences of the rule of capture, see
supra note 59 and accompanying text.
61. For further discussion of the waste that fracking causes, see supra notes 13-
14 and accompanying text.
62. For further discussion of the correlative rights doctrine, see infra notes 63-
92 and accompanying text.
63. For a history of the correlative rights doctrine, see infra notes 64-92 and
accompanying text.
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from beneath adjacent lands.”64  First, the well operator cannot in-
jure the source of supply of other owners.65  Second, the operator
cannot take an undue portion from the common pool.66
The Young court suggested that the rule of capture “was
adopted near the turn of the century primarily as a rule of necessity
when courts concluded that the amount of oil and gas which
drained toward a production well from neighboring tracts was inca-
pable of measurement.”67  In Young, the plaintiff owned approxi-
mately 180 acres of land.68  The adjacent properties, controlled by
the defendants, were used for the production of salt-water brine via
injection wells.69  The district court found that the high-pressure
injection of salt water through one well was creating an artificially
induced movement of the bromine rich salt-water from beneath the
plaintiff’s property, forcing it into the defendant’s other wells.70
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit held that “the rule of capture does
not apply, and that the defendants’ actions in forcibly removing val-
uable minerals from beneath Young’s land constitute[d] an action-
able trespass” because “the brine solution under his land would not
migrate to the defendants’ production wells but for the force ex-
erted by the injection wells.”71  The court noted that, as far as they
knew, “the rule of capture has been applied exclusively . . . to the
escape, seepage, or drainage of ‘fugacious’ minerals which occurs
as an inevitable result of tapping a common reservoir.”72
Some states also have statutes that prohibit the abuse of correl-
ative rights.73  Arkansas, for example, has a statute that prohibits
64. Young v. Ethyl Corp., 521 F.2d 771, 774 (8th Cir. 1975) (explaining rule of
capture doctrine).
65. Id. (stating first limitation on rule of capture).
66. Id. (stating second limitation on rule of capture).  The court in Young
supported their holding by noting “[i]f causing undue drainage is an abuse of
correlative rights, then a fortiori forcing static minerals under one’s neighbor’s
land to migrate amounts to an abuse of those rights.” Id.
67. Id. (explaining necessity of rule of capture).  “The rule of capture has
been applied exclusively, so far as we know, to the escape, seepage, or drainage of
‘fugacious’ minerals which occurs as an inevitable result of the tapping of a com-
mon reservoir.” Id.
68. Id. (stating case facts).
69. Young, 521 F.2d at 774 (stating location of defendants’ wells in relation to
plaintiff’s property).
70. Id. at 771 (explaining process defendant used to extract bromine rich salt-
water).
71. Id. at 774 (holding rule of capture does not apply to forcible movement as
opposed to natural movement of subsurface salt-water).
72. Id. (noting application of rule of capture to natural subsurface
movement).
73. For further discussion of states’ correlative rights doctrines, see infra notes
74-92 and accompanying text.
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“withdrawals causing undue drainage between tracts of land.”74  Re-
lying on this statute, the court in Young reasoned “[i]f causing un-
due drainage is an abuse of correlative rights, then a fortiori forcing
static minerals under one’s neighbor’s land to migrate amounts to
an abuse of those rights.”75
The Texas Supreme Court also recognized this doctrine in El-
liff v. Texon Drilling Co., a case in which the defendant allowed his
well to blow out and burn.76  The plaintiffs in Elliff owned a tract of
land which they were using to produce oil.77  It was estimated that
their property overlaid almost half of the gas reservoir.78  The de-
fendants owned an adjacent tract of land on which they drilled a
well tapping into the same reservoir.79  While drilling their well, 446
feet from the plaintiffs’ property line, “the [defendants’] well blew
out, caught fire, and cratered.”80  As a result of the blowout, a fis-
sure continued to slowly grow, and eventually, encased and de-
stroyed the plaintiffs’ well, causing it to blow out.81  As the cratering
process continued, “large quantities of gas and distillate were
drained from under [plaintiffs’] land and escaped into the air.”82
The Elliff court focused on “whether the law of capture ab-
solve[d] [the defendants] of any liability for the negligent waste or
destruction of [the plaintiffs’] gas and distillate, though substan-
tially all of such waste or destruction occurred after the minerals
had been drained from beneath [plaintiffs’] land.”83  The court
first noted that in general, courts recognize that while in the
ground, oil and gas are trapped, and remain in a static condition
until they are disturbed by an outside force.84  Thus, “each land-
owner should be afforded the opportunity to produce his fair share
74. Young, 521 F.2d at 775 (stating Arkansas law); see also Ark. Stat. Ann. § 53-
109(I)(3) (providing abuse of doctrine statute).
75. Id. (reasoning if excessive drainage of wells is abusing correlative rights
doctrine, then so is forcing minerals to move to different wells).
76. Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 210 S.W.2d 558, 559 (Tx. 1948) (recognizing
correlative rights doctrine in Texas).
77. Id. (describing plaintiffs’ tract of land).
78. Id. (noting significance of plaintiffs’ property and amount of gas con-
tained under it).
79. Id. (explaining defendants’ proximity to plaintiffs’ drilling activities).
80. Id. (stating well location).
81. Elliff, 210 S.W.2d at 559 (detailing consequences of initial well blowout).
In addition to destroying the plaintiffs’ well, the blowout also caused two of the
plaintiffs’ water wells to crater and blowout. Id.  There was also significant surface
damage to the plaintiffs’ property and cattle. Id.
82. Id. (explaining consequences of cratering process).
83. Id. at 560 (defining issue in case).
84. Id. at 561 (recognizing that courts understand oil and gas remain in place
until disturbed).
11
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of the recoverable oil and gas beneath his land” and may do so by
“sink[ing] as many wells as he desires upon his tract of land and
extract therefrom and appropriate all the oil and gas that he may
produce . . . .”85  This privilege, however, does not give landowners
the right to waste the gas.86  Ultimately, the court held that the de-
fendants were not protected under the rule of capture, but rather,
“[a]t the time of their removal [the oil and gas] belonged to [the
plaintiffs], and their wrongful dissipation deprived [the plaintiffs]
of the right and opportunity to produce them.”87
Elliff demonstrates how the correlative rights doctrine places a
limit on the rule of capture and helps to protect neighboring land-
owners.88  Although landowners are entitled to capture the oil and
gas that are accessible through their well, they are not permitted to
waste what they produce.89  States have also created statutory meth-
ods to prevent waste that would otherwise be allowed by the rule of
capture.90  Some states have enacted setback and well spacing rules
which regulate how far wells must be from the property line, as well
as the distance between each well.91  States also regulate forced
pooling and the amount of oil and gas that may be produced by a
well to ensure that the gas and oil are produced in the most effec-
tive manner.92
3. Ownership-in-Place vs. Non-Ownership Theory
The ownership-in-place theory provides that “a landowner
owns the oil and gas which was originally in place beneath his sur-
85. Id. at 562 (giving landowners ability to drill as many wells as they want to
capture oil and gas from underneath their property).
86. Elliff, 210 S.W.2d at 562 (holding landowners have no right to waste gas
and oil that is under their property).
87. Id. (holding plaintiffs could recover because defendants wasted gas and
oil).
88. See Elliff, supra notes 76-87 and accompanying text (discussing correlative
rights limitation on rule of capture).
89. C. Elaine Carleton & Lauren Matthews, Everything You Wanted to Know
About Oil & Gas Interests (But Were Afraid to Ask), CARLETON LAW FIRM LLC, http://
legis.sd.gov/interim/2012/documents/OGS6-12-12MineralInterest-SeveredAban
doned.pdf (last visited Feb. 6, 2015) (discussing various gas rights scenarios).
90. Id. at 8-9 (explaining state laws preventing waste as result of fracking).
91. See generally Five Facts About Pennsylvania’s Setback Requirements, MARCELLUS
SHALE COALITION (June 2, 2014), http://marcelluscoalition.org/2014/06/five-
facts-about-pennsylvanias-setback-requirements/ (comparing Pennsylvania setback
laws with other states).
92. See generally Compulsory Pooling Laws: Protecting the Conflicting Rights of Neigh-
boring Landowners, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES (October 24,
2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/energy/compulsory-pooling-laws-protecting-
the-conflicting-rights-of-neighboring-landowners.aspx (detailing states laws on
forced pooling).
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face acreage.”93  Under this theory, the oil and gas is subject to real
property laws even while it remains in the ground.  A number of
states including Pennsylvania, Texas, and West Virginia have
adopted the ownership-in-place theory.94  Conversely, the non-own-
ership theory states “that no person owns the minerals until pro-
duced, but that the right to produce is limited to those persons who
own land upon which a well may be drilled.”95
D. Subsurface Trespass
“Trespass is an invasion in to another’s exclusive right to pos-
session of property.”96  In order to sustain a trespass action, the
plaintiff must show actual damages or an interference with some
reasonably anticipated use of his property.97  Although trespass is
typically associated with a surface intrusion, the law also recognizes
both airspace and subsurface intrusions.98  Courts must recognize
these intrusions because in order for the landowner to use and en-
joy the property, the landowner “typically must have ownership
rights and control with respect to some distance above and below
the surface.”99  For instance, a house will project into the airspace
and the foundation will occupy the subsurface.100  The homeowner
will likely need to run sewer and water lines underground and elec-
trical lines above or below ground.101
93. C. Elaine Carleton & Lauren Matthews, Everything You Wanted to Know
About Oil & Gas Interests (But Were Afraid to Ask), CARLETON LAW FIRM LLC, http://
legis.sd.gov/interim/2012/documents/OGS6-12-12MineralInterest-SeveredAban
doned.pdf (last visited Feb. 6, 2015) (differentiating between ownership-in-place
and non-ownership theories).
94. Id. at 8-9 (listing states that have adopted ownership-in-place).  The states
include Arkansas, Colorado, Kansas, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana,
New Mexico, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, Washington, and
West Virginia. Id.
95. Id. at 9 (explaining non-ownership theory).  States that have adopted this
theory include Alabama, California, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, New
York, Ohio, and Wyoming. Id.
96. Elements of Trespass, USLEGAL, INC. http://trespass.uslegal.com/ (last vis-
ited Jan. 16, 2016) (providing trespass definition).
97. See Chance v. BP Chemicals, Inc., 670 N.E.2d 985, 993-94 (Ohio 1996) (hold-
ing plaintiffs could not recover because they failed to prove “physical damage or
actual interference with the reasonable and foreseeable use of the properties”);
Boudreaux v. Jefferson Island Storage & Hub, LLC, 255 F.3d 271, 275 (5th Cir. 2001)
(holding plaintiff failed to prove actual damage to property).
98. See generally Hannabalson v. Sessions, 90 N.W. 93 (Iowa 1902) (recognizing
airspace trespass); Hastings Oil Co. v. Texas Co., 234 S.W.2d 389 (Tex. 1950) (recog-
nizing subsurface trespass); see also Restatement (Second) of Torts § 159 (1965).
99. Hall, supra note 39 (explaining importance of ownership interest in air
above and ground below for use and enjoyment of property).
100. Id. (providing example of airspace intrusion caused by structures).
101. Id. (analogizing subsurface and airspace intrusion).
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Drilling wells for oil and gas production can also result in sub-
surface trespass.102  There are two basic types of wells: horizontal
and vertical.103  Vertical wells travel directly from the surface down
to the reservoir that is being tapped into.104  Horizontal wells, on
the other hand, travel vertically down before branching off at an
angle or parallel to the ground.105  Horizontal wells offer numerous
advantages over vertical wells; for example, “[h]orizontal wells cre-
ate maximum surface area contact between the gas-bearing rock
formation and the well itself.”106  Horizontal wells “[also] allow[ ]
producers to reach target gas locations that could not be reached
using traditional vertical drilling.”107
There are three basic trespass scenarios that can occur as a re-
sult of drilling vertical or horizontal wells.108  The most basic tres-
pass occurs when a well is intentionally drilled at an angle and
purposefully crosses a property line.109  A trespass may also occur
when artificial cracks caused by hydraulic fracturing extend from
one property to another.110  Lastly, a trespass may occur from sub-
surface migration of fracking fluids or natural gas seeping onto a
neighboring property from an injection or disposal well.111  This
last scenario has the potential to be the most problematic due to
the lack of knowledge concerning the environmental and health
consequences of fracking.112
102. For examples regarding how drilling can lead to subsurface trespass, see
infra notes 108-112 and accompanying text.
103. For further discussion on the various types of wells, see infra notes 103-
107 and accompanying text.
104. See A Look At What Hydraulic Fracking Is and Its History, supra note 4 (ex-
plaining what vertical wells are).
105. For further discussion of the advantages of horizontal wells, see infra
notes 106-107.
106. Stone v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, Civil Action No. 5:12-CV-102, 2013
WL 7863861 at *4 (N.D.W. Va. 2013) (citing Note, The Legality of Drilling Sideways:
Horizontal Drilling and Its Future in West Virginia, 115 W.VA. L. REV. 491, 497 (2012)
(discussing benefits of horizontal wells as compared to vertical wells)).
107. Id. (explaining that horizontal wells capture more gas than vertical
wells).  Due to the higher production rates, a higher return on the project itself is
likely. Id.
108. For further explanation concerning different trespass scenarios, see infra
notes 109-112 and accompanying text.
109. For further discussion of subsurface trespass resulting from intentional
slant drilling, see infra notes 113-124 and accompanying text.
110. For further discussion of subsurface trespass resulting from artificial
cracks, see infra notes 125-133 and accompanying text.
111. For further discussion of subsurface trespass resulting from subsurface
migration, see infra notes 152-166 and accompanying text.
112. For further discussion on potential environmental and health risks
caused by fracking, see infra notes 152-158 and accompanying text.
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1. Slant Drilling
Out of all the potential well-drilling scenarios, slant drilling
creates the most straight-forward case for subsurface trespass.113
Slant drilling is the process of drilling on one property and either
intentionally or inadvertently bottoming on an adjacent prop-
erty.114  When this type of drilling occurs without the consent of
both landowners, courts have held that it constitutes an actionable
trespass.115
In 1950, for example, the Texas Supreme Court heard Hastings
Oil Co. v. Tex. Co., a case dealing with three vertical wells that ac-
cidently diverted from their vertical track, and as a result, bottomed
on the adjacent property.116  The court held that although the de-
fendant had not yet completed the well, the defendant was commit-
ting a continuing trespass.117  The court reasoned “[t]respasses of
this character are irreparable because they subtract from the very
substance of the estate,” and thus the courts must be quick to act.118
The court also recognized “where the trespass is continuous in its
nature, constantly adding to the injury, the legal remedy is inade-
quate because a jury cannot fix upon a time when the wrong may
be said to be complete.”119
Due to the clear-cut nature of this type of claim, when the
Texas Supreme Court first faced a trespass claim for hydraulic
fracking in the 1961 case of Gregg v. Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp., the court
compared fracking to slant drilling or a deviated well.120  In Gregg,
an oil and gas lessee believed that hydraulic fracturing on an adja-
cent property would result in fracture lines crossing onto his prop-
erty and thus sought an injunction.121  By the time the case reached
113. For further discussion on horizontal and slant drilling, see infra notes
114-124 and accompanying text.
114. Kate Mantle, The Art of Controlling Wellbore Trajectory, SCHUMBERGER LTD.
(Winter 2013/2014), http://www.slb.com/resources/publications/oilfield_review
/~/media/Files/resources/oilfield_review/ors13/win13/defining_dir_drill.ashx
(explaining different types of directional wells).
115. See generally Hastings Oil Co. v. Texas Co., 234 S.W.2d 389, 398 (Tex. 1950)
(holding slant drilling constitutes trespass); see also Gliptis v. Fifteen Oil Co., 16 So.2d
471, 474 (La. 1943) (holding slant drilling constitutes trespass).
116. Hastings Oil Co., 234 S.W.2d at 391-92 (explaining drilling procedure and
how vertical well deviated).
117. Id. at 398 (holding defendant was trespassing under plaintiff’s property).
118. Id. (reasoning damages from subsurface trespass are irreparable).
119. Id. (recognizing harm caused by subsurface trespass cannot be
adequately remedied).
120. Gregg v. Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp., 344 S.W.2d 411, 418 (Tex. 1961) (compar-
ing fracking to slant drilling).
121. Id. (giving facts of the case).
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the Texas Supreme Court, the court determined that the only issue
before it was whether the district court had the jurisdiction to hear
the case, but the court nevertheless stated that “sand fracing under
the surface of another’s land constitutes subsurface trespass.”122
The court noted that “[t]o constitute a trespass, ‘entry upon an-
other’s land need not be in person, but may be made by causing or
permitting a thing to cross the boundary of the premises.’”123
While the court failed to “determine whether the alleged trespass
constituted subsurface trespass, this case demonstrates the analyti-
cal and physical similarities between directional drilling and hy-
draulic fracturing.”124
2. Hydraulic Fracturing
Just a year after the Texas Supreme Court ruled in Gregg, it
addressed “whether a trespass is committed when secondary recov-
ery waters from an authorized secondary recovery project cross
lease lines” in R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Manziel.125  The court ulti-
mately held “a trespass does not occur when the injected, secondary
recovery fluids move across lease lines” when the Railroad Commis-
sion has appropriately authorized the operation.126  In reaching its
conclusion, the court “emphasized the important policy considera-
tions behind allowing water-flooding,” explaining that such opera-
tions “should be encouraged” in order to increase production
levels, and that “secondary recovery programs could not and would
not be conducted if any adjoining operator could stop the project
on the grounds of subsurface trespass.”127
Gregg and Manziel were the only cases to address subsurface
trespass in the context of hydraulic fracking until the Texas Su-
preme Court heard Geo Viking, Inc. v. Tex-Lee Operating Co. in
122. Id. (discussing whether there is a trespass when subsurface fractures
cross property lines).
123. Id. at 416 (citing Glade v. Dietert, 295 S.W. 2d 642, 645 (Tex. 1956)).
124. Colleen Lamarre, Owning the Center of the Earth: Hydraulic Fracturing and
Subsurface Trespass in the Marcellus Shale Region, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 457,
476 (Winter 2011) (noting importance of dicta in Gregg and how it could be ap-
plied to hydraulic drilling cases).
125. R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Manziel, 361 S.W.2d 560, 566-67 (Tex. 1962) (de-
fining case issue).
126. Id. at 556-69 (holding authorized secondary recovery operations do not
constitute trespass).
127. Brannon Robertson, Important Case on Subsurface Trespass Pending before the
Texas Supreme Court, KING & SPALDING (May 2014), http://www.kslaw.com/library/
newsletters/EnergyNewsletter/2014/May/article1.html (discussing three relevant
Texas cases and their impact on each other).
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1991.128  In Geo Viking, the court noted that “[f]racing under the
surface of another’s land constitutes a subsurface trespass.”129  It
therefore determined “the rule of capture would not permit Tex-
Lee to recover for a loss of oil and gas that might have been pro-
duced as the result of fracing beyond the boundaries of its tract.”130
It seemed Texas had finally reached a clear understanding of sub-
surface trespass:
If fractures crossed on to an unpermitted tract, this act
would constitute a subsurface trespass.  On the other
hand, if fracing fluid was shown to have transgressed prop-
erty lines and it was authorized by the RRC [Railroad
Commission] then, this event was not actionable as a sub-
surface trespass due to the development of the negative
rule of capture.131
Indeed, just a few months later in Gifford Operating Co. v. Indrex,
Inc., the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Texas held it was “bound by Texas case law which clearly recognizes
a subsurface trespass when a sand fracture not authorized by the
Railroad Commission reaches across lease lines.”132
This clarity, however, did not last long.  Less than a year after
its initial decision, the Texas Supreme Court withdrew its opinion
in Geo Viking and stated that “[i]n denying petitioner’s application
for writ of error, we should not be understood as approving or dis-
approving the opinions of the court of appeals analyzing the rule of
capture or trespass as they apply to hydraulic fracturing.”133
Through this statement, the Texas Supreme Court once again frac-
tured the clarity regarding the liability of landowners and well oper-
ators in cases of subsurface trespass.
128. Geo Viking, Inc. v. Tex-Lee Operating Co., No. D-1678, 1992 WL 80263, at *2
(Tex. 1992) (addressing subsurface trespass liability in hydraulic fracturing case).
129. Id. (holding fracture lines that cross lease lines constitute subsurface
trespass).
130. Id. (explaining why rule of capture would not allow for recovery).
131. Chris Kulander and Robert Shaw, Toward Uniformity in Subsurface Trespass
Jurisprudence – Geophysical Techniques, Hydraulic Fracturing, Gas Storage, and Injection
Well Disposal, UNIV. TX., available at https://kbhenergycenter.utexas.edu/wp-con
tent/files/Hydraulic-Fracturing-and-the-Rule-of-Capture.pdf (explaining where
Texas courts stood on subsurface trespass at this point).
132. Gifford Operating Co. v. Indrex, Inc., 2:89-CV-0189, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
22505, at *16-17 (N.D. Tex. 1992) (holding sand fractures that crossed property
lines constituted trespass).  In this case, a sand fracking operation crossed the
neighboring property line and destroyed the integrity of the neighboring prop-
erty’s well. Id.
133. Geo Viking, Inc. v. Tex-Lee Operating Co., 839 S.W.2d 797, 798 (Tex. 1992)
(withdrawing its initial per curium decision).
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III. CONFLICTING DECISIONS IN COASTAL OIL, STONE, AND FPL
With the courts avoiding the issue of subsurface trespass, well
owners were left not knowing how far the limits of their drilling
operations could extend.  As fracking practices increased, however,
courts in Texas and West Virginia were soon forced to come up
with a solution to the trespass issue.  Unfortunately, the two states
reached opposite conclusions.134  Texas continued to leave the
question of trespass open, suggesting that no trespass occurs, while
West Virginia concluded that taking oil from under another’s prop-
erty constituted an actionable trespass.135
A. Subsurface Fracture Lines
Sixteen years after Texas Supreme Court withdrew its opinion
in Geo-Viking, the court finally clarified the subsurface trespass issue.
In Coastal Oil, the Texas Supreme Court addressed “whether subsur-
face hydraulic fracturing of a natural gas well that extends into an-
other’s property is a trespass for which the value of gas drained as a
result may be recovered as damages.”136  The case involved two
properties, both leased by Coastal Oil and located on the Vicksburg
T, “a ‘tight’ sandstone formation, relatively imporous and imperme-
able, from which natural gas cannot be commercially produced
without hydraulic fracturing stimulation.”137  Coastal Oil had
drilled a well 467 feet from the property boundary of the plain-
tiff.138  They intended the hydraulic length to “reach over 1,000 feet
from the well,” but “the furthest distance from the well to the
[property] lease line was 660 feet.”139
The jury found that Coastal Oil’s well had trespassed onto the
plaintiff’s property, “causing substantial drainage, which a reasona-
bly prudent operator would have prevented, and $1 million dam-
ages in lost royalties.”140  On appeal to the Texas Supreme Court,
the court held “the rule of capture bars recovery of such dam-
134. For further discussion on the conclusions reached by the Texas and West
Virginia courts, see infra notes 136-166 and accompanying text.
135. For an analysis of how the Texas and West Virginia courts reached their
conclusions, see infra notes 167-229 and accompanying text.
136. Coastal Oil, 268 S.W.3d at 4 (defining case issue).
137. Id. (describing Coastal Oil’s property locations).
138. Id. at 6 (noting location of disputed well).
139. Id. at 7 (explaining distances between property lines and well).  Addi-
tionally, the amount of proppant injected into this well greatly exceeded that of
any other well on the property. Id.
140. Id. at 8 (stating jury found trespass and damages).  The trial court, how-
ever, reduced damages to $543,776 and Costal Oil appealed. Id.
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ages.”141  In reaching its conclusion, the court offered four justifica-
tions for its decision.142  First, the landowner can drill his own well
to offset the drainage from his property, and he can also offer to
pool with the other driller.143  Second, allowing the court to award
damages for the value of drained oil and gas usurps to the courts
the authority of the Railroad Commission to regulate oil and gas
production.144  Third, the courts cannot determine the material
facts that are hidden below miles of rock such as where the oil or
gas came from and how much came from certain areas.145  Finally,
the court relied on numerous amicus briefs to determine that no
one in the oil and gas industry wants or needs to change the appli-
cation of the rule of capture to hydraulic fracturing.146
Shortly after the Texas Supreme Court ruled in Coastal Oil,
however, the District Court for the Northern District of West Vir-
ginia came to a significantly different conclusion in Stone.147  In
Stone, the owners of the property adjacent to that of the plaintiffs
drilled a horizontal well; the vertical well was approximately 200
feet from the property line, but the horizontal aspect was within ten
feet.148  Both properties were used for the production of oil and
gas.149  The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants had trespassed
onto their property and failed to protect the plaintiffs’ property
from drainage.150  The court held “hydraulic fracturing under the
land of a neighboring property without that party’s consent is not
protected by the ‘rule of capture,’ but rather constitutes an actiona-
ble trespass.”151
141. Coastal Oil, 268 S.W.3d at 4 (holding rule of capture bars recovery of
damages).
142. For a further discussion of the four justifications, see infra notes 143-146
and accompanying text.
143. Coastal Oil, 268 S.W.3d at 14 (reasoning adjacent owners can drill their
own wells to prevent capture by neighbors).
144. Id. (ensuring Railroad Commission maintains well-drilling decision-mak-
ing power).
145. Id. at 16 (recognizing courts are neither equipped nor knowledgeable
enough about oil drilling to make these decisions).
146. Id. (reasoning rule of capture should not be changed because industry
people do not want rule changed).
147. Stone, 2013 WL 2097397 at *8 (holding hydraulic fracturing under neigh-
bor’s property without neighbor’s consent constitutes actionable trespass).
148. Id. at *1 (describing where vertical and horizontal wells were located in
relation to Stone property).
149. Id. (noting use of both properties for oil and gas extraction).
150. Id. (stating plaintiff’s claims).
151. Id. at *8.
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B. Subsurface Migration of Wastewater and Fracking Fluids
Although the Texas Supreme Court has determined that sub-
surface fracture lines do not constitute trespass, the court has not
resolved the question of whether wastewater and injection fluids
crossing property lines constitutes trespass.152  In FPL Farming Ltd.
v. Envtl. Processing Sys., L.C., the Texas Supreme Court addressed
whether injected wastewater, which likely migrated across a prop-
erty line and contaminated the adjacent property’s water supply,
constituted trespass.153  FPL alleged EPS trespassed onto its prop-
erty by causing subsurface wastewater to migrate into the subterra-
nean level of FPL’s tracts, which are located next to a tract on which
EPS operates a non-hazardous waste injection well.154  As a result of
the alleged trespass, “the waste plume polluted the briny water
found there.”155  Thus, the court had to determine “whether EPS
[was] responsible for forcing the waste plume to travel to the sub-
surface of FPL’s tracts.”156
The Texas Court of Appeals initially held “under common law,
when a state agency has authorized deep subsurface injections, no
trespass occurs when fluids that were injected at deep levels are
then alleged to have later migrated at those deep levels into the
deep subsurface of nearby tracts.”157  This holding, however, was
reversed and remanded by the Texas Supreme Court, which held
that “a person holding a permit issued by the TCEQ [is] not
shielded ‘from civil tort liability that may result from actions gov-
erned by the permit.’”158
On remand, the court of appeals recognized the “Texas Legis-
lature, by statute, acknowledge[s] the landowner’s ownership inter-
est in the groundwater beneath the surface.”159  It therefore
concluded FPL had an actionable claim for trespass because FPL
152. For further discussion on Texas’s subsurface migration case law, see infra
notes 153-166 and accompanying text.
153. FPL Farming Ltd. v. Envtl. Processing Sys., L.C., 383 S.W.3d 274, 280 (Tex.
App. 2012). (stating issue court had to rule on).
154. Id. at 309 (stating FPL’s claim).
155. Id. (claiming trespass caused subterranean briny water to become
polluted).
156. Id. at 280 (detailing what must be determined by the court).
157. FPL Farming Ltd. v. Envtl. Processing Sys., L.C., 305 S.W.3d 738, 744-45
(Tex. App. 2009) (holding trespass had occurred).
158. FPL Farming Ltd., 351 S.W.3d at 308 (reversing court of appeals in hold-
ing permits do not shield defendant from tort liability).
159. Id. (recognizing ownership interest in subsurface drinking water as well
as briny water).
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has a legal interest in its property under Texas law.160  The court
also noted that “the fact that EPS is using the deep subsurface for
commercial purposes indicates that the subsurface levels at issue
have economic potential for storing waste, which otherwise, absent
its safe storage, has the potential to adversely affect the
environment.”161
This judgment, however, was ultimately reversed by the Texas
Supreme Court.162  The court then “reinstate[d] the trial court’s
judgment that the landowner take nothing, and decline[d] the invi-
tation to address the remaining questions presented in [the] ap-
peal—namely, whether deep subsurface wastewater migration is
actionable as a common law trespass in Texas.”163  Although the
court did not address subsurface trespass, it did provide an exten-
sive history and analysis of trespass causes of action.164  In order to
have a successful trespass cause of action in Texas, the Court stated
that three elements must be present: “(1) entry (2) onto the prop-
erty of another (3) without the property owner’s consent or author-
ization.”165  The court concluded that it is the “plaintiff’s burden to
prove that the entry was wrongful, and the plaintiff must do so by
establishing that entry was unauthorized or without its consent.”166
IV. ANALYSIS
Throughout the United States, and especially in Texas, courts
have avoided ruling on whether hydraulic fracturing lines that cross
property lines constitute a trespass.167  Indeed, courts have made an
effort to avoid discussing or giving any direction on this question.
In Coastal Oil, for example, the court did so by relying solely on the
rule of capture.  Similarly, in Stone, the court relied on the archaic
ad coelum doctrine, which no United States court has ever literally
applied to the fullest extent possible.  Additionally, the FPL opinion
160. Id. (concluding FPL had actionable claim for trespass).  The appeals
court remanded the case to the trial court after finding “the trial court improperly
placed the burden of proving consent to entry on FPL when that burden should
have been placed on EPS.” Id. at 309.
161. Id. (noting economic value of subsurface areas).
162. Envtl. Processing Sys., L.C. v. FPL Farming Ltd., 457 S.W.3d 414, 416 (Tex.
2015) (reversing court of appeals holding).
163. Id. at 416 (declining to address whether deep subsurface wastewater mi-
gration is actionable).
164. Id. at 418-25 (analyzing Texas trespass law).
165. Id. at 419 (providing elements for trespass cause of action).
166. Id. at 425 (stating plaintiff’s burden of proof in trespass actions).
167. For a further discussion on Texas case law, see supra notes 134-166 and
accompanying text.
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expressly stated that the court would not address the issue of sub-
surface trespass and, instead, focused solely on traditional trespass
causes of action.
A. Coastal Oil
According to the Texas Supreme Court, “[t]he rule of capture
is a cornerstone of the oil and gas industry and is fundamental both
to property rights and to state regulations.”168  The court explained
that fracking, or forced stimulation, is the very basis of the rule and
it is no more unnatural than the drilling of the well itself, “without
which there would be no need for the rule at all.”169  When the
court discussed the term “unnatural,” however, it failed to consider
the term to mean “the unnatural migration of gas caused by the
insertion of an object into another’s property.”170  In doing so, the
court brushed over the holding in Young, which was based on the
unnatural movement caused by fracking.171  As a result, the Texas
Supreme Court then declared it would not be addressing the issue
of trespass as it was precluded by the rule of capture.172  This ratio-
nale, however, is most likely the court’s biggest flaw.
As the Coastal Oil dissent noted, the Texas Supreme Court in
Peterson v. Grayce Oil Co. held that “[t]he rule of capture precludes
liability for capturing oil or gas drained from a neighboring prop-
erty ‘whenever such flow occurs solely through the operation of nat-
ural agencies in a normal manner, as distinguished from artificial
means applied to stimulate such a flow.’”173  Moreover, the majority
stated “[i]t should go without saying that the rule of capture cannot
be used to shield misconduct that is illegal, malicious, reckless, or
intended to harm another without commercial justification, should
such a case ever arise.”174  The court’s decision, however, “ig-
nore[d] the fact the rule of capture does not necessarily apply if the
168. Compare Coastal Oil, 268 S.W.2d at 13 (emphasizing importance of rule of
capture) with Young, 521 F.2d at 774 (concluding rule of capture does not apply to
forced migration of minerals).
169. Coastal Oil, 268 S.W.2d at 13 (comparing fracking with actual well
drilling).
170. See Aaron Stemplewicz, supra note 48, at 254 (analyzing court’s definition
of unnatural and noting that it failed to consider it as intended by plaintiff).
171. Young, 521 F.2d at 774 (stating limitation on rule of capture).
172. See Gregg v. Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp., 344 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. 1961) (failing to
make ruling on subsurface trespass).
173. Coastal Oil, 268 S.W.2d at 42 (Johnson, J. dissenting) (quoting Peterson v.
Grayce Oil Co., 37 S.W.2d 367, 370-71 (Tex. App. 1931), aff’d, 98 S.W.2d 781 (Tex.
1936)).
174. Id. at 17 (recognizing that rule of capture cannot be applied to illegal
activity).
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capture of oil or gas is made possible by a trespass or other illegal
activity.”175  Thus, the court should have first addressed the trespass
issue because if the gas was extracted illegally, the rule of capture
would not have applied.176  This highlights the major inconsistency
in the majority’s opinion: it left open the possibility for trespass
damages other than for drainage and thus “arguably [left] open the
possibility of a subsurface entry caused by fracturing being deemed
a trespass. . . .”177
In a further effort to avoid the issue of trespass, the court was
quick to distinguish surface trespass from subsurface trespass, and
in doing so, emphasized that the ad coelum doctrine “has no place
in the modern world.”178  The court explained that “[h]ad Coastal
[Oil] caused something like proppants to be deposited on the sur-
face of [the adjacent property], it would be liable for trespass,” and
due to the ad coelum doctrine, “one might extrapolate that the
same rule should apply two miles below the surface.”179  The court,
however, refused to consider applying that maxim.180  Instead, it
discussed Texas’s subsurface trespass case law and noted that the
issue has yet to be truly addressed by the court, as the opinion in
Geo-Viking, the only case to squarely address the issue, had been
withdrawn.181
The court also distinguished the application of the rule of cap-
ture to fracking from its application to slant drilling.182  It ex-
plained that the gas captured as a result of fracking migrates to the
vertical well, whereas the gas does not migrate to the slant well.183
Rather, the well goes to the gas, and potentially onto another’s
175. See Hall, supra note 39, at 395-96.
176. See Stemplewicz, supra note 48, at 253 (reasoning dissent proposed more
logical way of approaching case).
177. Barclay Nicholson & Brian Albrecht, Subsurface Trespass Emerging Issue,
THE AM, OIL & GAS REPORTER (Feb. 2012), available at http://www.nortonroseful
bright.com/files/us/images/publications/20120201AOGRSubsurfaceTrespass
Nicholson.pdf (examining recent fracking cases and how they impact subsurface
trespass issues).
178. Coastal Oil, 268 S.W.2d at 11 (explaining ad coelum doctrine has no
place in today’s law).  The court supported this by noting that Lord Coke, the
creator of the doctrine, “did not consider the possibility of airplanes.  But neither
did he imagine oil wells.  The law of trespass need no more be the same two miles
below the surface than two miles above.” Id.
179. Id. at 11 (noting how application of ad coelum doctrine could effect
trespass analysis).
180. Id. (failing to apply ad coelum doctrine).
181. Id. (discussing Texas case law addressing subsurface trespass).
182. Id. (distinguishing slant drilling from fracking).
183. Coastal Oil, 268 S.W.2d at 11 (contrasting how oil and gas travel to well
during fracking versus during slant drilling).
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property.184  The court reasoned that “[o]ne cannot protect against
drainage from a deviated well by drilling his own well; the deviated
well will continue to produce his gas.”185  In the case of fracking,
however, the court reasoned that “[i]f the drained owner has no
well, he can drill one to offset drainage from his property.”186
There are minimal differences, however, between slant wells
and hydraulic fractures.187  For example, “[b]oth involve a lease op-
erator’s intentional actions which result in inserting foreign materi-
als without permission into a second lease, draining minerals by
means of the foreign materials, and ‘capturing’ the minerals on the
first lease.”188  The majority also failed to recognize the financial
stability and expertise needed to drill a well, resources which the
average landowner does not possess.189  The majority’s “holding
[therefore] reduces incentives for operators to lease from small
property owners because they can drill and hydraulically fracture to
‘capture’ minerals from unleased and unpooled properties that
would otherwise not be captured.”190
B. Stone
In Stone, despite the plaintiff bringing an action for trespass,
the court avoided analyzing whether a trespass occurred by simply
stating “hydraulic fracturing under the land of a neighboring prop-
erty . . . constitutes an actionable trespass.”191  In making this asser-
tion, the court explicitly rejected the majority opinion in Coastal Oil
because it “gives oil and gas operators a blank check to steal from
184. Id.
185. Id. (explaining landowners cannot protect against drainage from devi-
ated well).
186. Id. at 14 (reasoning landowners can drill their own wells to prevent
neighbors from taking their oil and gas).
187. Id. at 44-45 (Johnson, J. dissenting) (arguing there are minimal differ-
ences between slant drilling and fracture lines).
188. Coastal Oil, 268 S.W.2d at 44 (Johnson, J. dissenting) (explaining why
both types are drilling are similar and should not be treated differently).
189. Id. at 45 (Johnson, J. dissenting) (reasoning average landowner does not
possess necessary resources to protect oil under their property).
190. Id. (Johnson, J. dissenting) (stating holding encourages oil companies
not to lease from small property owners and instead to simply capture their gas).
As the dissent noted, “[t]oday’s holding effectively allows a lessee to change and
expand the boundary lines of its lease by unilateral decision and action—fractur-
ing its wells—as opposed to contracting for new lease lines, offering to pool or
utilizing forced pooling, or paying compensatory royalties.” Id.
191. Stone, 2013 WL 2097397 at *8 (noting court failed to answer question
presented).
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the small landowner.”192  The court instead relied on the dissent in
Coastal Oil and the majority in Young to support its conclusion.193
By avoiding an analysis and decision on the trespass issue, the court
once again left open the potential for further litigation on the
matter.
The district court in Stone applied West Virginia trespass law
and stated it would not apply the Coastal Oil holding that the rule of
capture insulates well operators from trespass liability in hydraulic
fracturing operations.194  West Virginia law provides that “trespass is
‘an entry on another man’s grounds without lawful authority, and
doing some damage, however inconsiderable, to his real prop-
erty.’”195  The court began its trespass analysis by recognizing that
West Virginia had adopted the rule of capture, but then noted that
in Trent v. Energy Dev. Corp., the “Fourth Circuit left open the issue
of whether the rule of capture includes oil and gas recovered by
hydraulic fracturing.”196  In Trent, the Fourth Circuit stated “short
of committing a trespass . . . the law of capture allows a landowner
‘to use artificial means of stimulating production even though the
effect is to increase the drainage from the land of another.’”197  As
such, the defendants strongly urged the court to adopt the holding
in Coastal Oil to bar the recovery of damages under the rule of cap-
192. Id. at *6 (rejecting holding in Coastal Oil).  The court reasoned under
Coastal Oil, oil “companies may tell a small landowner that either they sign a lease
on the company’s terms or the company will just hydraulically fracture under the
property and take the oil and gas without compensation.” Id.
193. See generally Coastal Oil, 268 S.W.3d at 42-51 (Johnson, J. dissenting) (ex-
plaining how court reached its conclusion).
194. Stone, 2013 WL 2097397 at *5-6 (explaining why Coastal Oil holding
would not be applied).
195. Id. at *8 (quoting Hagy v. Equitable Production Co., Civil Action No. 2:10-
cv-01372, 2012 WL 1813066 at *4 (S.D.W.Va. May 2012) (citing West Virginia tres-
pass law)).  The court also cited the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 158: “[t]he
actor, without himself entering the land, may invade another’s interest in its exclu-
sive possession by throwing, propelling, or placing a thing either on or beneath the
surface of the land or in the air space above it.”  Restatement (Second) of Torts
§ 158, Comment i.
196. Stone, 2013 WL 2097397 at *2 (recognizing West Virginia adoption of
rule of capture).  West Virginia’s rule of capture states that “[oil and gas] belong to
the owner of the land, and are part of it, so long as they are on it or in it subject to
his control; but then they escape and go into other land, or come under another’s
control, the title of the former owner is gone.” Id. (quoting Energy Dev. Corp. v.
Moss, 591 S.E.2d 135, 147 (W. Va. 2003)).
197. Stone, 2013 WL 2097397 at *2 (quoting Trent, 902 F.2d at 1147, n.8) (ex-
plaining how rule of capture law in West Virginia)).
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ture.198  The court, however, declined to do so reasoning self-help
remedies are inadequate to many landowners.199
After a detailed discussion of the facts and holding in Coastal
Oil, the court focused on the dissent’s discussion of how the rule of
capture should apply only to naturally flowing gas, and not gas that
is forced to migrate due to hyrdofracking.200  The court found the
most influential argument to be the one discrediting the Coastal Oil
majority’s theory that landowners can drill their own well to prevent
neighboring property owners from extracting gas from underneath
their land.201  According to the dissent, not only is this a very costly
endeavor, but most property owners are not sophisticated enough
to engage in such an activity.202  Further, the Eighth Circuit’s ratio-
nale in Young that “the common law rule of capture is not a license
to plunder,” a principle that the Coastal Oil majority seemingly ig-
nored, heavily influenced the court’s decision.203
The court also refuted the Coastal Oil majority’s assertion that
the ad coelum doctrine “ha[d] no place in the modern world.”204
To counter this statement, the court relied on a 2003 West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals case, Energy Dev. Corp. v. Moss, which
reaffirmed the doctrine.205  In making this blanket assertion, “the
[Coastal Oil majority] oversimplified the dispute it faced by casually
dismissing the possibility that the ad coelum doctrine might [ ] ap-
ply at the depths at which the defendants were operating, and that
the defendants’ actions therefore might [ ] constitute a trespass.”206
If the court applied this same rationale to airspace, however, then
198. Id. at *4 (outlining defendant’s arguments concerning why court should
adopt Coastal Oil holding); compare Trent v. Energy Dev. Corp., 902 F.2d 1143, 1147
n.8 (4th Cir. 1990).  In this case, the defendants argued that the rule of capture
should not apply “because the flow of gas from the landowners’ tract was unnatu-
rally enhanced by hydrofracturing, a process whereby the producing strata is frac-
tured to increase the strata’s permeability and, as a consequence, the flow of gas
into the well.” Id.
199. Stone, 2013 WL 2097397 at *4 (finding self-help remedies insufficient).
200. For further discussion of the Stone Court’s analysis of the Coastal Oil dis-
sent, see infra notes 201-209 and accompanying text.
201. Stone, 2013 WL 2097397 at *4 (explaining what arguments were most
influential).
202. Id. (noting most significant argument dissent made focused on property
owners drilling their own wells).
203. Id. at *7 (citing Young, 521 F.2d at 774) (agreeing oil companies cannot
take oil from whoever they want, whenever they want).
204. Id. (citing Coastal Oil, 268 S.W.2d at 12) (noting holding in Coastal Oil
that ad coelum should not be applied)).
205. Id. at *7 (citing Energy Dev. Corp. v. Moss, 591 S.E.2d 135, 143 n. 14 (W.
Va. 2003) (recognizing West Virginia still uses ad coelum maxim)).
206. Hall, supra note 39 at 399 (providing criticisms of Coastal Oil and Stone
holdings).
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any low-flying aircraft or drone, which flew over another individ-
ual’s property, would not constitute a trespass despite the invasion
that occurred.207  This theory, however, does not follow the tradi-
tional trespass model which only allows for trespass at elevations
that would reasonably interfere with a landowner’s use and enjoy-
ment of his property.208  Likewise, it has been suggested that this
traditional model is also consistent with other court holdings that
found no liability for injection disposal operations.209
C. FPL
During the initial appeal in FPL, the appeals court held that
“under common law, when a state agency has authorized deep sub-
surface injections, no trespass occurs when fluids that were injected
at deep levels are then alleged to have later migrated at those deep
levels into the deep subsurface of nearby tracts.”210  Upon further
appeal to the Texas Supreme Court, however, the court held that a
person holding a permit issued by the Texas Commission on Envi-
ronmental Quality (TCEQ) was not shielded “from civil tort liability
that may result from actions governed by the permit.”211  Conse-
quently, the case was remanded to the appeals court to hear the
parties’ trespass claim arguments.212  In order to win on the trespass
claim, FPL had the burden of proving that Environmental Process-
ing Systems, L.C. (EPS) interfered with its right of possession.213
On remand, EPS argued that “Texas case law does not recog-
nize a claim for trespass to protect possessory rights at the depths
that are at issue in this case.”214  The court disagreed however, cit-
ing both Gregg and Hastings Oil, which recognized the possibility of
207. See Thrasher v. City of Atlanta, supra note 44 and accompanying text.
208. Hall, supra note 39 at 400 (explaining traditional trespass model and why
Stone’s interpretation was overly broad and unreasonable).  “The Model would not
impose trespass liability for high altitude flights because a landowner could not
reasonably be expected to use such elevations in connection with his use and en-
joyment of his land.” Id.
209. Id. at 400-01 (reasoning that application of ad coelum doctrine applies
to injections wells as it does airspace).
210. FPL Farming Ltd., 351 S.W.3d at 308 (stating holding on first appeal).
211. Id. (quoting FPL Farming Ltd. v. Envtl. Processing Sys., L.C., 351 S.W.3d
306, 314 (Tex. 2011) (holding permits do not shield issuee from liability)).
212. Id. (explaining procedural background).
213. Id. (citing Russell v. Am. Real Estate Corp., 89 S.W.3d 204, 208 (Tex. App.
2002) (providing burden of proof)).
214. Id. (arguing Texas case law does not support subsurface trespass claim).
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subsurface trespass at such depths.215  The court further cited to
another recent Texas Supreme Court decision that “clearly found
that the ownership of groundwater is like the ownership of oil and
gas, namely that the owner has a possessory interest in the water or
oil and gas that is subject to the rule of capture and police power
regulation.”216  Thus, the court found no difference between di-
minishing the market value of oil and gas, and that of fresh or briny
water.217
This rationale brings into question the court’s prior decision in
Manziel, which held that no trespass occurs when injection fluids
move across property lines during the secondary recovery process as
long as the Railroad Commission had authorized the action.218  In-
deed, the FPL court held that state-issued permits do not shield the
well operator from trespass liability if the claimant can show that
there was a cross-boundary migration of injection fluids.219  While
these cases deal with distinct permit issuing agencies, it is difficult
to distinguish the two scenarios because both involve the invasion
of the subsurface space below another individual’s property.
EPS went on to argue “it should have the right to use the stor-
age potential of the unexploited space below FPL’s tracts.”220  The
court reiterated the Texas Supreme Court’s holding that the
TCEQ-granted permit merely gave EPS the authority to use the
space below their property for injection purposes, and not the
space below FPL’s tract.221  Moreover, “the fact that EPS is using the
deep subsurface for commercial purposes indicates that the subsur-
face levels at issue have economic potential for storing waste, which
otherwise, absent its safe storage, has the potential to adversely af-
fect the environment.”222  Thus, the court reasoned without the
possibility of a trespass remedy, FPL “does not have all of the legal
215. FPL Farming Ltd., 351 S.W.3d at 309 (citing cases that counter EPS’s argu-
ments).  For further discussion of Gregg and Hastings Oil, see supra notes 116-124
and accompanying text.
216. Horizontal Drilling and Trespass, 25 COLO. NAT. RES., ENERGY & ENVTL. L.
REV. 321 (2014) (citing Edwards Aquifer Auth. v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814 (Tex. 2012)
(explaining holding in Day)).
217. FPL Farming Ltd., 351 S.W.3d at 281 (analogizing market value of oil and
gas to that of groundwater).
218. For further discussion of the rationale in Manziel, see supra notes 125-127
and accompanying text.
219. FPL Farmking Ltd., 351 S.W.3d at 312 (holding state-issued permit does
not shield well operator from tort liability).
220. Id. (stating EPS’s second argument).
221. Id. (explaining purpose of permit and its limitations).
222. Id. (noting subsurface space has economic potential because it is already
being used for commercial purposes).
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remedies typically available to owners to protect the owner’s right
to the exclusive use of its property.”223
The economic potential argument can, and has been, made
for gas and oil.  Here, the court reasoned that EPS could not use
the storage space below FPL’s property because of the potential ec-
onomic value, even though FPL was not presently using the
space.224  Similarly, in both Manziel and Coastal Oil, the courts em-
phasized the social and economic importance of fracking and sec-
ondary recovery by stating that such activities should be
encouraged.225  Despite the similarities in the circumstances sur-
rounding these cases, the Texas courts managed to reach substan-
tially different conclusions concerning subsurface space.
On a recent appeal back to the Texas Supreme Court for the
second time, the court decided to take the case and make a final
ruling.226  This ruling, however, did not help to clarify the issue of
subsurface trespass as it simply reinstated the trial court’s jury ver-
dict that the landowner take nothing.227  After providing an exten-
sive discussion of traditional trespass claims, the court declined to
address the issue of deep subsurface wastewater migration.228  In its
discussion, the court did however cite to Coastal Oil in stating “every
unauthorized entry upon land of another is a trespass even if no
damage is done or injury is slight, and gives a cause of action to the
injured party.”229  This would suggest that deep subsurface trespass
is a viable cause of action, however, at this point, the court has not
resolved this question.
V. IMPACT
At present, courts remain in disagreement as to whether the
rule of capture includes the right to capture by artificial means.
The Coastal Oil court suggested that it does include the right, but as
223. Id. (holding trespass remedy is necessary because otherwise landowner
would be lacking all available remedies).
224. For further discussion of the economic potential argument in FPL, see
supra notes 220-223 and accompanying text.
225. See Coastal Oil, 268 S.W.3d at 30-35 (Willett, J. concurring) (discussing
economic importance of drilling).
226. Envtl. Processing Sys., L.C. v. FPL Farming Ltd., 457 S.W.3d 414, 416 (Tex.
2015) (noting court did not address subsurface trespass).
227. Id. at 416 (reinstating trial court’s judgment which was decided by jury
trial).
228. Id. at 416-25 (discussing traditional trespass causes of action).
229. Id. at 421 (citing Coastal Oil, 268 S.W.3d 1, 12 n. 36 (Tex. 2008) (empha-
sis added) (noting any entry onto land of another is trespass, even if no damage is
done).
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the Stone court noted, the Coastal Oil opinion gives landowners only
two options: (1) drill their own well; or (2) enter into a lease agree-
ment on the company’s terms allowing them to capture the oil.230
Both of these options place a large burden on small landowners,
jeopardize the amount of oil that can be captured, and could po-
tentially have catastrophic consequences on the environment.
The holdings in Coastal Oil and Stone have the potential to cre-
ate a snowball effect in which landowners race to drill wells on their
property in an effort to capture oil and gas before their neighbor
can.  When wells are drilled in close proximity to each other, their
production levels decrease and they tend to produce oil at a slower
rate.231  While some states have enacted statutes regulating the
spacing between wells, it remains to be seen whether such legisla-
tion will be enough to prevent the drilling of an excessive number
of wells.232  Furthermore, when oil production from a particular
well begins to slow, drilling companies typically engage in secon-
dary or enhanced recovery operations.233  This results in greater
use of fracking fluids, thereby creating a need for more waste dispo-
sal wells.234
Additionally, in many states, it is nearly impossible to learn
what chemicals are used during the fracking process, although it is
known that many of them have adverse health consequences.235
These chemicals can be extremely dangerous if the fluids leak into
ground water wells.236  In response to ground water well contamina-
230. Stone, 2013 WL 2097397 at *6 (examining flaws in Coastal Oil opinion).
“Under such a rule, the companies may tell a small landowner that either they sign
a lease on the company’s terms or the company will just hydraulically fracture
under the property and take the oil and gas without compensation.” Id.
231. Kevin Thuot, There Will Be Blood: Well Spacing & The Bakken Shale Oil Milk-
shake, DRILLING INFO (Nov. 26, 2013), http://info.drillinginfo.com/well-spacing-
bakken-shale-oil/ (explaining how spacing between wells effects oil production).
232. Travis Brannon & Walton Shepherd, Marcellus Shale Drilling Comparative
White Paper, W.VA. COLLEGE OF LAW (Spring 2012), available at http://energy.
law.wvu.edu/r/download/130703 (comparing drilling laws from New York, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, and West Virginia).
233. For further discussion of oil recovery processes, see supra notes 7-12 and
accompanying text.
234. For further discussion of the waste caused by fracking, see supra notes 22-
27 and accompanying text.
235. Michael Kelley, The 10 Scariest Chemicals Used in Hydraulic Fracking, BUSI-
NESS INSIDER (Mar. 16, 2012), http://www.businessinsider.com/scary-chemicals-
used-in-hydraulic-fracking-2012-3 (discussing chemicals used in fracking process
and their harmful effects).
236. Andrew Nikiforuk, Shale Gas: How Often Do Fracked Wells Leak?, RESILI-
ENCE.ORG (Jan. 10, 2013), http://www.resilience.org/stories/2013-01-10/shale-gas-
how-often-do-fracked-wells-leak (discussing frequency of drinking well contamina-
tion and what effects it has).
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tion concerns, scientists from universities around the country have
studied the gas content of “113 drinking-water wells and one meth-
ane seep overlying the Marcellus shale in Pennsylvania, and [ ] 20
wells overlying the Barnett shale in Texas.”237  The study analyzed
the “noble gases and their isotopes in groundwater near shale-gas
wells.”238  The data ultimately “appeared to rule out gas contamina-
tion by upward migration” from where horizontal drilling or hy-
draulic fracturing occurred to the underground aquifer.239  Rather,
the results showed that the gas contamination came from much
shallower depths.240  Thus, the researchers concluded that hydrau-
lic fracturing is not the cause of contamination, but instead “well-
integrity problems such as poor casing and cementing” cause con-
tamination.241  Now that the source of contamination has been rec-
ognized, oil and gas companies will be able to focus on how to
make safer wells moving forward knowing that the structural integ-
rity is key to preventing groundwater contamination.
Despite this somewhat promising research, states should, at a
minimum, follow the trespass model that has been used to address
airspace trespass, at least until more is known about the effects of
fracking.  This model will allow drilling companies to continue ex-
tracting oil from deep subsurface reservoirs while working to pro-
tect groundwater.  Although this model may ease the concerns of
groundwater contamination, issues of disposal waste that is stored
closer to the surface remain unresolved despite the holding in
FPL.242
237. Duke University, Contaminated Water in 2 States Linked to Faulty Shale Gas
Wells, EUREKALERT (Sept. 15, 2014), http://www.eurekalert.org/pub_releases/
2014-09/du-cwi091014.php (explaining study conducted by scientist on ground-
water contamination near wells).  The study examined “eight clusters of wells—
seven in Pennsylvania and one in Texas—with contamination, including increased
levels of natural gas from the Marcellus shale in Pennsylvania and from shallower,
intermediate layers in both states.” Id.
238. Id. (explaining what gases were analyzed and their origin).
239. Thure Cerling, Noble Gases Identify the Mechanisms of Fugitive Gas Contami-
nation in Drinking-Water Wells Overlying the Marcellus and Barnett Shales, PROCEEDINGS
OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCI. OF THE U.S.A. (Aug. 12, 2014), http://www.pnas.org/
content/111/39/14076, (detailing study conducted on groundwater contamina-
tion of wells located in clusters around drilling sites).
240. Id. (concluding contamination source was not at depths where horizon-
tal fracking occurred).
241. For further discussion on the results of the study, see Duke University,
supra note 237.
242. Abraham Lustgarten, Injection Wells: The Poison Beneath Us, PROPUBLICA
(June 21, 2012), http://www.propublica.org/article/injection-wells-the-poison-be
neath-us (depicting depths that fracking and waste disposal occur at).
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While landowners may be unable to bring a successful subsur-
face trespass claim, they may be able to succeed on other theories
such as nuisance, negligence, or strict liability.243  To prove a nui-
sance claim, landowners “may be able to prove easily that their lawn
used to be green but is now dead from fracing fluids or other frac-
ing-related surface activities.”244  Similarly, landowners may have a
fairly straightforward claim for negligence, especially if there is a
well blowout situation like the one in Elliff.245  In order to bring a
strict liability case, however, the state must recognize drilling as an
ultra-hazardous activity.246  Unfortunately for landowners, “courts
have uniformly refused to find that oil and natural gas drilling and
related activities are ultra-hazardous or abnormally dangerous, and
thus have found that such activities are not subject to strict liability
under tort law.”247  In support of this, courts have typically cited to
the social and economic benefit of fracking and reasoned that
properly executed drilling operations, conducted in appropriate ar-
eas and coupled with the economic and community benefit, out-
weigh the risk involved with hydraulic fracturing.248  Despite the
availability of these potential tort claims, it is unlikely that success
under one of these tort theories would adequately remedy the ef-
243. Earl Hagstrom, Hydraulic Fracturing Litigation is on the Rise, HYDRAULIC
FRACTURING DIGEST (Sept. 2011), http://www.sedgwicklaw.com/hydraulic-fractur
ing-litigation-is-on-the-rise-09-19-2011/ (discussing types of claims landowners are
bringing against drilling companies).
244. Hannah Wiseman, Untested Waters: The Rise of Hydraulic Fracturing in Oil
and Gas Production and the Need to Revisit Regulation, 20 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 115
(2005) (proposing alternative theories to trespass claims).
245. For further discussion of the Elliff case, see supra notes 76-92 and accom-
panying text.
246. See generally Christopher Ball, Marcellus Shale and the Ultrahazardous Activ-
ity Analysis, THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (October 14, 2011) http://www.mankogold
.com/media/publication/25_Ball_and_Marcellus_Shale_and_Ultrahazardous_Ac
tivity.pdf (discussing Pennsylvania case holding drilling is not abnormally danger-
ous); Joe Schremmer, Avoidable “Fraccident”: An Argument Against Strict Liability for
Hydraulic Fracturing, 60 KANSAS L. REV. 1225-232 (2012) (explaining fracking strict
liability claims).
247. Ely v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., No. 3:09–cv–2284, 2014 WL 4071640, at *1
(W.D.Pa. 2014) (giving history of strict liability applied to fracking).  On Novem-
ber 19, 2009, however, Pennsylvania was “invited to take a step which no court in
the United States [had] chosen to take, and declare hydraulic fracturing to be an
ultra-hazardous activity that gives rise to strict liability.” Ultimately, the court de-
clined to do so.  Gina Passarella, Drilling Contamination Case Narrowed Against Cabot,
THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (January 14, 2015), http://www.thelegalintelligencer.
com/home/id=1202715050360?cn=20150113&pt=PM%20Legal%20Alert&src=EM
C-Email&eteditorial&bu=the%20Legal%20Intelligencer&slreturn=201500160920
34 (giving background of Ely case and how groundwater contamination effected
them).
248. Ely v. Cabot Oil & Gas Corp., 2014 WL 4071640 at *11-14 (applying Re-
statements six factor test to case facts).
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fects of fracking due to the damage that is caused by the act itself.
Thus, until the courts take a stronger stance on fracking, or states
enact stricter laws, it is unlikely that landowners will have a suffi-
cient remedy for damage or losses caused by fracking.
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